The Round-Trip Fallacy

The Round-Trip Fallacy

Gilbert, 1981).
The Round-Trip Fallacy

While these norms are part of ideal scientific reasoning, real reasoning
diverges in systematic ways from this archetype. Reasons for this divergence lie
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within the limits of our cognitive capacities and a preference for fast and
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effortless processing. Loosely defined, a fallacy is a characteristic failure in reasoning

Introduction

(“Fallacy” (n.d.) §1.1), characteristic because the same mistakes occur in similar

In this essay I will explain the concept of the Round-Trip Fallacy and
show that it is a distinct reasoning mistake. The round-trip fallacy involves

situations. A further aspect of fallacies is that the reasoning seems valid for the one

inferring from the absence of evidence of an event the conclusion that there is

committing the fallacy and other reasoners tricked by the fallacy (Walton, 1999).
We can use fallacies to explain mistakes in reasoning. Consider the

evidence for the absence of this event. I claim that this is a widely committed
and potentially hazardous mistake. First, I present Nicholas Taleb's original

fallacy of affirming of the consequent (Geis and Zwicky, 1972). Imagine

account of the round-trip fallacy (Taleb 2007). Then, I will develop this fallacy

somebody says that she smoked cigarettes for the last thirty years and was

in such a way that it can be used as a precise tool for analysing reasoning

diagnosed with lung-cancer recently. Of course, you know that smoking may

mistakes, thereby going beyond Taleb's original formulation. I argue my account

cause lung-cancer. It seems obvious that her smoking caused the lung-cancer.

of the fallacy is distinct from Taleb's in important ways. Lastly I show how a

Yet this is not necessarily true. Maybe she tells you in the next sentence that she

mistake in scientific reasoning exemplifies the fallacy and I will offer a proposal

worked in an asbestos-factory in the same period of time, also a very likely

for countering such shortcomings in the research process. The contribution of

cause of lung-cancer (Uguen et al., 2017). The conclusion that smoking caused

this work is a more precise definition of the round-trip fallacy. I think the limits

the cancer seems valid yet the truth of the consequent (the occurrence of cancer)

of our reasoning-capacity become clearer through this inquiry into failed

does not imply the truth of the antecedent (smoking cigarettes as a cause) and

reasoning.

concluding that the antecedent is true is not warranted by the accessible
information (Geis and Zwicky, 1972). Explicating the fallacy in this way makes

Fallacious reasoning in general

evident that the judgement is logically invalid; fallacies can help explain

In its ideal form, reasoning can be characterized as abiding by certain

mistakes in reasoning. Furthermore, such errors are more likely in similar

constraints from logic, e.g. truth- preservation (Stenning and Van Lambalgen,

situations. This can be helpful for building structures that counterbalance

2008), updating hypotheses in light of evidence (Bradley, 2015), and neutrality

predictable non-ideal performance. The analysis of the round-trip fallacyis

with respect to non-epistemic values (see Bueter, 2015 for a discussion). On a

similarly useful for correcting reasoning.

methodological level, Popper’s falsificationism, Lakatos’ research programs

The round-trip fallacy as described by Taleb

(Lakatos 1970), Kuhn’s concerns with the scientific community and other

Nicholas Nassim Taleb identifies a reasoning mistake in his book The

notions influence the ideal of scientific reasoning significantly (Mulkay and

Black Swan that he calls the Round- Trip Fallacy (Taleb, 2007). Taleb’s
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description of the fallacy is brief; he explains his idea by giving examples of the
fallacy. I will try to refine his idea in more precise terms in the course of this
essay. He asks us to imagine someone who, having observed a limited set of data
which does not include any surprising, impactful event, “would tell you, and

Swan:

There is absence of evidence of a particular event x.
There is evidence of absence of this particular event x.
Absence of evidence of x → evidence of absence of x.
Consider a draw of observations from a set which may contain a

rightly so, that there is no evidence of the possibility of large [impactful] events

particular event x. Let's assume there is a chance bigger than zero that you do

(Taleb, 2007) (italics in original).” The mistake in reasoning is:

not observe x in your draw. The first statement says you do not have evidence

You are likely to confuse that statement, however, particularly if
you do not pay close attention, with the statement that there is
evidence of no possible [surprising and impactful events]. Even
though it is in fact vast, the logical distance between the two
assertions will seem very narrow in your mind, so that one can be
easily substituted for the other. I call this confusion the round-trip
fallacy, since these statements are not interchangeable (Taleb,
2007).

that x is in the set, since you have not observed it and the second statement
means that one may be able to rule out the observation of event x in the set of
events. The third element of the round-trip fallacy expresses the conflation of the
general claim with the observational statement. This conflation of observation
with the general claim is decisive. Someone observes absence of event x,
believes that this implies that this is evidence for no event x and draws the

Note that Taleb's reference to evidence of “no possible” events is likely
an unintended error. The examples Taleb gives to illustrate the round trip fallacy do
not refer to “impossibility” or imply that the unobserved event is “impossible.” If a

conclusion that there is evidence for the absence of x. Now the question arises
whether this belief, that the one statement can be inferred from the other, is

patient receives a negative result for a cancer-screening, the doctor may infer –

justified. That is, can “no evidence of x” be exchanged with “evidence of no x”?

mistakenly – that there is evidence of the absence of cancer in the patient’s tissue – thus

If the second statement was entailed by the first, the inference to the second

the round-trip fallacy – but it is hardly likely that the doctor would infer that it is

statement would be warranted. This is a decisive question that Taleb skips over.

impossible for the patient to have cancer. After all, cancer is still conceivable, the

Moreover, he fails to delineate when the inference is justified and when it is not.

screening doesn't show it is an analytical truth that the patient is cancer-free.

He mentions that there is a vast logical distance between the two
statements though they may seem close to each other – the warrant for inferring

Refining the account

from the first to the second statement is weak. “Evidence of no x” is not entailed

Although Taleb’s description sparks interest, it lacks precision. Taleb’s
description of the fallacy stays on an intuitive level and does not make explicit why the

by “no evidence of x,” that is, there is no valid deductive inference from one to

fallacy is a fallacy in the first place. The reader of his account therefore left with the

the other statement. Additionally, one may make an inductive inference from

intuition that “something seems wrong” about the described reasoning and may feel a

“no evidence of x” to “evidence of no x” but it comes with high inductive

sense of unease. We need to explain the idea that “these two statements are not
interchangeable (Taleb, 2007).” Statistical terminology lends itself well to this task since
the core of the fallacious reasoning is an unjustified inductive inference. Three main

observations from. A toy example may help illustrate the point. Take an
idealized draw from an urn which either contains 100 balls of all the same color

elements of the round-trip fallacy can be derived from Taleb's account in The Black
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(e.g. 100 blue balls) or of two different colors equally distributed (e.g. 50 blue

one might willfully disregard missing evidence or the lack of uniformness of

and 50 red). You do know these two possibilities but not which set-up is the

events one is concerned with. In such cases, the difference between “absence of

case. If you draw 49 blue balls, you observe “no evidence of red balls.” You

evidence of x” and “evidence of absence of x” is overlooked.

cannot claim that you have evidence that there are no red balls yet it is very

From this discussion it may have become apparent that a critical cause of

likely that there are only blue balls in the urn. Thus, the inductive inference to

the round-trip fallacy is poor understanding of statistics. A key claim of The

the claim there are only blue balls in the urn is well supported by the empirical

Black Swan is that the social world we move around in is too often falsely

evidence however it is not necessitated by it. In this example, the inferential

perceived, by experts and lay-people alike, as containing regularities, e.g.

basis for inferring from “no evidence of x” to “evidence of no x” is strong. Now

following a Gaussian distribution, when in reality it is quite unpredictable and

suppose you observe 51 draws of blue balls and know the two possible set-ups

volatile (Taleb, 2007). Thus, even though my account of the round-trip fallacy

of the urn, you could say with certainty that the urn only holds blue balls and

goes well beyond Taleb’s initial formulation, it still stays true to his general

that you have evidence of the absence of red balls. In this case the absence of

claim. The round-trip fallacy is one manifestation of how mischaracterization

red balls and the knowledge about the urn allows the inference that there are no

and oversimplification of our reality arises out of a misconception of statistical

red balls in the urn. Yet in the real world we usually do not have such

representativeness and likelihood-distributions. An integral aspect of fallacies is

information and more importantly, the assumed distributions from which such

that those who commit the fallacy are not aware of the mistake and the drawn

events are drawn are less idealized and more unpredictable.

inference appears valid (Walton, 1999). This aspect seems to be present in the

Surely, justified inductive inferences have to be distinguished from cases
where the round-trip fallacy can arise. The fallacy can occur when the

round-trip fallacy since the misconception of the distance between the two
central statements makes the inference seem valid.

observations you are trying to generalize from are not representative enough to

In sum, then, the round-trip fallacy is committed when one makes a

support the generalization. This can be the case when the number of

mistaken inductive inference from the absence of evidence of x to the

observations on a set of events is too small relative to the size of the. Claiming

conclusion that there is evidence of the absence of x. I have described how this

that there are only blue balls in the urn after having observed 10 blue balls is

fallacy arises and what statistical notions it is based upon. It may seem as if the

misjudging the distance between these 10 observations and the claim that there

round-trip fallacy is just a variant of other types of fallacious generalization. I

is evidence for the generalization that there are only such balls. Furthermore, the

will consider this possibility in the next section.

fallacy can occur when the events one observes do not follow a discernible

Examples of reasoning mistakes through the round-trip fallacy

pattern or cannot be assumed to be distributed amongst a Gaussian, uniform-

The pervasiveness of the round-trip fallacy can be seen in diverse

distribution, or any other such well-known statistical distribution. You can find

examples. I will look at examples from science, medical practice and reasoning

yourself in such a situation when you don't know that the events do not (!) fit a

in the financial sector. A scientific example is the search for extraterrestrial life.

Gaussian distribution or that there are many more possible observations. Also,
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Projects such as the Voyager program, the Hubble Space Telescope and other

between “no evidence of a crash” and “evidence of no crash” is vast logically.

international space programs yield much information about the make-up of other

Furthermore, the burst of the bubble on March 10, 2000 shows that drawing this

solar-systems (Swain et al., 2008). So far, no evidence for extraterrestrial life has

inference can have dire consequences. The 2008 financial crisis, caused by a

been found through these programs. To conclude that this is evidence of the

mortage-bubble, the “Great Crash” of 1929 and other such crashes show that

absence of extraterrestrial life would be an instance of the round-trip fallacy.

this is a reoccurring phenomenon (Ferguson, 2008). In part this is due to the fact

Especially since space is vast and only a fraction of it was ever observed, the

that investors look at the absence of a crash in the last years and the rising

logical distance between “no evidence of extraterrestrial life” and “evidence of

performance of their shares and then reason to the conclusion that the market

no extraterrestrial life” is vast and inferring the second from the first statement is

will continue to develop like this in the future or at least for now. Yet they miss

not supported by the premise. Here it may seem unlikely that one would commit

the fact that their observation alone does not warrant this inference. The round-

the round-trip fallacy since the logical distance between the two statements is

trip fallacy can be found in the reasoning of doctors, investors and lay-people

quite apparent and the inferential basis for such an inference is obviously weak.

alike and does not seem restricted to a particular domain of reasoning.
These examples show that the round-trip fallacy can arise in a variety of

In the next example this distance is subtler. In order to assess whether a patient
has cancer or not, a sample of tissue is usually taken to be tested for cancerous

situations, sciences and with varying impact. I will now give a more in-depth

cells. The doctor attempts to take a sample as representative as possible. If the

account of research on lead-poisoning to show that scientists committed the

test is negative, the doctor did not observe evidence for cancer. If she claims,

round-trip fallacy when searching for the dose-effect relation for lead. Lead is a

based on the negative test and without considering further tests, that she has

highly toxic heavy metal affecting virtually all organs and especially the

evidence that the patient does not have cancer, she is committing the round-trip

developing nervous system (Mushak, 2011). Thus, it is important to know the

fallacy (Taleb, 2007). The absence of cancerous cells is not proof that there is no

relation of lead-dosage to health risk for children. Scientists and policy makers

cancer in the body. Yet at first glance this may seem as a valid medical

are interested in finding out the threshold of lead concentration above which

assessment. The third example shows that the round-trip fallacy is commonly

negative health effects can be observed.

committed, even by experts. An example from economics is the financial crash

Observational studies and case studies of children exposed to lead in

associated with the dot-com bubble burst. If you look at the stock market-

their environment accumulated between 1920 and 1940 (Rabin, 1989). The

valuation of internet and technology companies in the U.S.A. between 1995 and

studied toddlers and young infants ingested the lead paint of their cribs, toys and

March 2000, you would see a steady increase in their value and “no evidence of

children’s rooms and suffered from severe symptoms of Plumbism such as

a crash.” One might draw the inference that this is “evidence of no crash” for the

vomiting, abdominal pain, irritation, anemia, lack of muscular coordination,

future. But that would show overconfidence in the resilience of the stock-

peripheral motor paralysis, etc. (Byers and Lord, 1943). The mounting evidence

market, falsely based on the reassuring good performance of the last few years.

led the American Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to issue a

Such reasoning is an instance of the round-trip fallacy because the distance

policy statement which categorized blood lead levels above 60 μg/dL as
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requiring medical intervention (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

A proposal to counter the round-trip fallacy

(2005)). This threshold was subsequently lowered in light of more accurate

The mistakes committed in the research might have been avoided if the

testing to a level of 10 μg/dL (ibid.). It may look like an example of good

scientific community had implemented the right procedures. I will consider a

scientific practice resulting in vital policy decisions. Yet the scientific

proposal by Hugh Lacey regarding approaches to hypotheses and whether his

community seems to have missed more subtle effects of lead-poisoning

notion can counter the round-trip fallacy (Lacey, 2005). Holding, adopting and

(Lamphear, 2005). This failure is an example of the round-trip fallacy. The

endorsing are three attitudes one can take to a theory (ibid.). I claim that

evidence that was considered by the scientists included children with visible

researchers on Plumbism unjustifiably held the belief that there are low-levels of

symptoms of lead-poisoning but there were no subjects with low levels of lead

lead without harm while they would have been more justified in seriously

in their blood since this does not cause the symptoms the scientists were

endorsing this belief. Holding a proposition means treating it as “belonging to

screening for (Sciarillo et al., 1992). The fallacy plays out in the following way.

the stock of established scientific knowledge (ibid.).” You are only justified in

First, the observation is made that there is no evidence that low levels of lead

holding a proposition if all lines of research that could falsify the proposition

cause harm. Infer from that there is evidence low levels of lead do not cause

have been exhaustively examined, that is, all objections have been answered.

harm. As a result of this wrong inference a threshold is postulated below which

The scientists researching lead poisoning failed this test because they did not

lead is not supposed to be harmful which is exactly what the CDC's guidelines

consider children with different, more subtle symptoms. If they had, they would

did. For instance, Lamphear et al. (2005) found more subtle effects of low levels

have found an effect of lead-poisoning at levels below the assumed threshold.

of lead by analyzing effects on IQ measurements of subjects with lead-levels

When the regulatory body, the CDC, issued a policy statement proposing this

below 10 μg/dL. They did not find any “safe” level of lead when considering the

threshold, the claim that low levels of lead have no effect was held at that time

more elusive effects on intelligence.

but was unjustified. Lacey acknowledges that in some cases one must proceed

The occurrence of the fallacy is partly due to the sampling of the studies.

even though not all aspects of a topic have been reviewed (ibid.). In that case,

Since the researchers included only subjects with certain physical symptoms, the

Endorsing the proposition is the correct attitude, that is, one should treat it “as

sample was not representative of all symptoms associated with lead exposure.

being supported by evidence that is sufficiently strong that the legitimacy of

The toxic effects of lead are multifarious, the investigating scientists came from

courses of action [...] informed by it, should not be challenged on the ground

different backgrounds and consequently the research lacked coordination

that [the proposition] has insufficient empirical support (ibid.).” Furthermore, a

(Mushak, 2011). This facilitated susceptibility to the round-trip fallacy. This

proposition may be seriously endorsed only if it was based on inclusive

example shows that the scientific community may commit the round-trip fallacy

research, that is research by scientists representing the different ethical and

and that taking note of this mistake helps explaining the reasoning by the

social values of a democratic society, and is tested against the strongest available

scientists.

evidence. If the CDC had adopted the approach of seriously endorsing the
threshold-claim, they might have added some cautionary remarks or qualifiers
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such as “it is likely that below 10 μg/dL no harm should be expected.” The
scientists would have looked for effects of lower levels earlier had the threshold
not been set thus confidently. Lacey’s different approach could have countered
the effects of the round-trip fallacy. Establishing resistance against holding or
endorsing an idea can prevent mistaken reasoning.
Conclusion
In this essay I considered the role of fallacies for explaining reasoningprocesses. The round-trip fallacy was singled out as a distinct mistake in our
reasoning. I took Taleb’s description of the reasoning mistake as a basis for
precisely defining the fallacy as inferring the statement “there is evidence of no
x.”from the statement “there is no evidence of x.” Contrary to appearances, this
inference is not justified because the basis for moving from the first to the
second statement is too weak in all but the most simplified cases, such as the
example of drawing from an urn of red and blue balls as described earlier. The
round-trip fallacy can occur in many different domains and especially in
scientific inquiry. Within a well-structured scientific community, the resultsof
the round-trip fallacy can be contained. I considered a proposal by Hugh Lacey
for structuring scientific inquiry. If we understand the logical error at the core of
the fallacy, we can learn how to adjust our institutions and environment to
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